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What is the best compensation What is the best compensation package to 
offer employees?  How should choice among 
investments in pension plans be structured?   
Should a government use auctions to sell 
natural resources?  Is it possible to design a 
market to reduce non-point source pollution in 
Quebec’s watersheds?  What holds people 
back from trying technologies that are 
completely new to them?   
 
Over the last two decades a revolution has 
occurred in the advancement of our ability to 
answer questions such as these.  This 
revolution is called experimental economics.   
Experimental economics is the use of a 
controlled laboratory environment to 
understand decisions people make.  In an 
economics experiment, people make decisions 
in a laboratory.  They are paid according to the 
outcome of their decisions, and their decisions 
are analyzed to determine the effect of an 
institutional or environmental change that is 
being tested. 
Through the analysis of behaviour in 
controlled economics experiments, much has 
been learned about behaviour when outcomes 
are uncertain: for example, new notions about 
preferences toward risk and consumption over 
time have been developed.  Much has also 
been learned about how people behave in 
strategic environments: for example, bidding 
behaviour in auctions is better understood, and 
the strategies people use as they learn how to 
trust each other have been observed. 
 
The purpose of this report is to describe the 
methodology of experimental economics and 
to detail its major uses.  We will focus on the 
ability to measure behaviours in a wide variety 
of situations important to organizations.  We 
will show, with examples from our own work, 
how feedback between the laboratory and the 
field can result in new understanding of 
decisions in an effort to affect the cycle of 
poverty in a developing country in 
fundamentally new ways.   




The Effects of Change 
 
 
hat is the best compensation package to offer employees?   
How should choice among investments in pension plans be 
structured?  Should a government use auctions to sell natural resources?  Is 
it possible to design a market to reduce non-point source pollution in 
Quebec’s watersheds?  What holds people back from trying technologies 
that are completely new to them? 
 
Answering questions such as these is important to businesses, 
governments, and organizations of all kinds.  Answering them is difficult 
because of the complexities and confounds that make understanding 
peoples’ behaviours in institutions difficult.  For example, a change in a 
compensation package rarely occurs in a vacuum.  Often such a change 
occurs during an upheaval in business conditions, such as a change in the 
overall economy, the marketing mix, or the management.  This makes it 
difficult if not impossible to identify the effect of the policy change on the 
performance of employees. 
 
Imagine that a manager had the ability to switch from a flat-rate 
compensation policy, in which employees are paid a fixed salary, to a 
piece-rate payment system, in which employees are paid according to the 
output they produce.  Imagine that everything else about the business 
could be held constant while making the switch.  This might allow her to 
detect a change in the performance of the employees, but what if she 
could do better than that?  What if she could observe the counterfactual, 
i.e., what if she could observe what would have happened had she not 
changed the compensation policy?  Then she could measure the effect of 
the policy change. 
 
This is precisely what economics experiments make possible.  In an 
economics experiment, people make decisions in a controlled situation, 
which is designed to measure the effect of a specific change in the 
decision-making environment.  To fix their incentives, they are paid 
according to the results of the decisions.   And their decisions and the 
results of their decisions are then analyzed against a theory or a standard 
W 
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of behaviour.  For example, in pay-for-performance experiments, people 
perform a task and are paid according to an actual compensation scheme.  
The experimenter can test different types of compensation, or test the 
effect of changing from one type to another.  
 
Now let us take the example of the manager who is interested the effect of 
compensation methods a step further.  Imagine she works for a company 
with operations in both Canada and China.  It is possible that, due to 
cultural or other reasons, different compensation packages should be 
implemented in the different locations.  Increasingly, economics 
experiments are conducted with this type of question in mind.  Through 
either portable laboratories or multiple laboratories, experiments can be 
used to understand and predict differences in behaviour between different 
groups of people. 
 
The rest of this report is organized as follows.  Section 1 introduces the 
experimental economics methodology, and details the types of behaviours 
that can be measured with it.  Section 2 shows how constant feedback of 
knowledge can be attained between the laboratory and the field, using an 
example of a cycle of poverty in a developing economy.  Section 3 
provides concluding comments.  
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Analyzing Behaviour in a Petri Dish 
 
 
1.1 Improving Foundations 
 
xperimental economics has its roots in the need to improve 
theories of behaviour. Theories are the foundation of the 
discipline.  They are used, for example, to form public policy, to design 
institutions, and to construct contracts common between businesses and 
private people. From expected utility theory, which describes how people 
should make decisions in uncertain environments, to game theory, which 
details what people should do in strategic situations, the question has long 
been whether the theory describes the way people actually make decisions.  
The problem is how to determine the empirical relevance of the theory.  
Experiments provide a method to do just that. 
 
Experimental economics is a part of a broader field called behavioural 
economics.  Behavioural economists use principles from psychology, as 
well as field and laboratory observation, to test and modify economic 
theory.  The purpose is to improve its ability to describe and predict 
behaviour (Camerer, 2003).  In an economics experiment, volunteers make 
decisions in a laboratory and are paid according to the results of their 
decisions (Kagel and Roth, 1995; Davis and Holt, 1993).  Their decisions 
are then typically compared with theoretical predictions or standards of 
behaviour.  For example, experimental economists showed for the first 
time in a controlled way that supply and demand curves really can predict 
the price and quantity of goods sold (Holt, 1995), that people will punish 
others for treating them unfairly even at cost to themselves (Fehr and 
Gaechter, 2006), and that information is conveyed in prices in stock 




In an economics 
experiment, 
volunteers make 
decisions in a 
laboratory and 
are paid 
according to the 
results of their 
decisions.  
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Economics experiments provide a feedback between economics and 
observed behaviour.  Once a theory is tested in the laboratory and found 
to be deficient, work is done to improve the theory.  The modified theory 
is tested again, resulting in a refinement that was not possible before the 
development of the experimental methodology.   
 
One strength of experimental economics is its widely accepted standard 
methodology.  First, economics experiments always compensate subjects 
in cash according to the results of their decisions.  The reason that 
economics experiments are incentivized are that (1) it is an easy way to 
universalize the consequence of an action with money because everyone 
understands what money is, and (2) it provides a standard methodology 
across experiments conducted by different experimenters, allowing us to 
compare results from a series of studies.  Second, there is no deception in 
an economics experiment.  This is primarily because our theories require 
beliefs to be correct, which requires us to avoid deception.  It is also 
important that our laboratories do not develop a reputation for deception 
since the word can travel between subjects.   
 
1.2 Whispering in the Ears of Princes 
A tremendous variety of social and strategic issues have been studied in 
the experimental laboratory.  Most studies can be broken down into three 
categories (Roth, 1995). 
 
First, economics experiments test theories.  For example, it has long been 
thought that people overbid in auctions, resulting in a situation in which 
the winner has bid too much, and is sorry that she won.  Overpaying at 
auction can be a shareholder issue during a hostile takeover.  It can also be 
an issue when governments auction hugely valuable public resources, such 
as frequencies for mobile phones, or rights for timber or oil.   
 
The winner’s curse is difficult to identify in normal bidding because we 
cannot observe the bidder’s true valuation of the item for which they are 
bidding.  Thus we cannot know if she is actually overbidding.  In the 




laboratory, by contrast, we can set a bidder’s valuation of an item 
ourselves, and pay her the difference between her valuation and the 
amount of money she pays for the item at auction.  With this type of a 
controlled experiment, new evidence for overbidding has added much to 
our knowledge of overbidding in auctions (Kagel, 1995).  The controlled 
experiments added new evidence for the existence and causes of the 
winner’s curse. 
 
Second, economics experiments suggest new theories.  For example, 
standard theory has traditionally not been able to describe addiction or 
procrastination. This is because economists have long assumed that people 
discount the future at a rate that does not depend on time, much like a 
compound interest rate.  In other words, $10 that I expect to receive in 30 
days is worth less to me than $10 I expect to receive today.  And the rate 
at which I discount these two payoffs is the same at which I discount the 
expectation of $10 in 31 days vs. $10 in 1 day.  
 
Experiments have shown, however, that patience is likely to be a function 
of time in a special way (Fredereick, Loewenstein, and O’Donohugh, 
2002).  In laboratory experiments, people tend to value future days against 
the present at a lower rate than they do between any two other days.  In 
other words, there is an extra discount whenever I compare today with any 
other day: today is special.  If today is special, then my time preferences 
can change in the following way:  I prefer $10 today to $11 tomorrow, but 
I prefer $11 in 31 to $10 in 30 days.  But when 30 days passes, I again 
prefer the $10 today to $11 tomorrow, i.e., after time passes my 
preferences reverse.  Think of trying to quit smoking: I’ll do it later, but 
when later arrives, well, I’ll do it later.  One way of describing this type of 
time preference is with “hyperbolic discounting,” and much 
experimentation is being done to find a preference model to best fit 
observed behaviour.   
 
Third, economics experiments are used for policy recommendations and 
the design of economic markets.  Issues such as education, social welfare, 
and the environment can be addressed.  For example, experiments have  
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been conducted to test the effect of school voucher programs in the 
United States (Bettinger and Slonim, 2006), and the savings decisions of 
working poor in Quebec (Eckel, Johnson and Montmarquette, 2006).   
Economics experiments have been conducted in developing economies to 
study such issues and peoples’ predisposition to contribute to public goods 
(Carpenter, Daniere and Takahashi, 2004).  School admissions procedures, 
multiple kidney exchange markets, electricity markets, and markets for 
trading carbon emissions permits are being designed with the aid of this 
tool as well (see Alvin Roth’spage at Harvard University for a list of 
references for market design: http://kuznets.fas.harvard.edu/~aroth/alroth.html). 
 
1.3 On the Road 
Real life problems involve a hugely heterogeneous group of people with 
regard to age, ethnicity, gender, and a host of other things that make us all 
different from each other.  Traditional economics experiments are 
conducted in laboratories, often located at universities, using a pool of 
subjects that consists largely of university undergraduates.  Such a pool of 
subjects is called a “convenience pool”, because these subjects are readily 
available for studies.  Increasingly, portable laboratories and laboratories 
across the world are used to study different subject populations. 
 
Examples of specific groups of people that have been the subject of 
interest are men, women, children, representative voters, working poor, 
factory workers, expert bidders at auctions, and students.  The explosion 
of field experiments is currently being documented at the web site 
www.fieldexperiments.com.   
 
1.4 Our Petri Dish 
At CIRANO we have a tremendous and well-used facility to conduct 
economics experiments.  Our laboratory, which is funded by Bell 
Laboratories, the Canadian Foundation for Innovation, and the FQRSC 
sports 20 workstations, 20 laptop computers, and 60 hand-held devices for 
use as a portable laboratory in the field.  
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Activity in our laboratory over a 6-month period in 2007 is listed in Table 
1.  The table reveals that our laboratory is used for a wide variety of 
purposes by many people from many institutions across the world.   
Fifteen researchers and four graduate students conducted studies in both 
French and English in this period. The table shows twelve projects ranging 
in topics from corruption to emotions.  In this brief period over $40,000 
in cash was paid to almost 1,500 subjects. 
Table 1 
CIRANO Laboratory Statistics, January – July 2007 
Experimental Projects 
A total of 11 research projects were carried from January to July 2007 (of those, 6 are new ones): 
‐  1,476 participants took part in 110 sessions (average of 13 participants per session)  
‐  $40,867.96 was given out in cash payments for an average of $27.69 per participant 
‐  Laboratory was used 62 days out of 125 potential days for a 50% utilisation rate 
Subject Pool 
 Number of subjects (active): 3,802 (1,997 English speaking and 3,025 French speaking) 
 Number of participants who have participated in a study since January 2007: 644 (435 English speaking, 529 
French speaking) 
Researchers 
 Number of researchers and graduate students involved: 15/4 
 Number of programmers and research assistants involved: 3/6 
Their affiliations: HEC Montréal, INRS, McGill University, Université de Montréal, Université Laval, 
Université Paris 1, University of Minnesota, UQÀM. 
Name of the Experiment  Experiment 
Language 




Aliments fonctionnels  fr  $3,730.00  FQRNT 
Analysts, Incentives and 
Cooperation 
en  $1,672.50  University of Minnesota 
Assurances  fr  $4,609.50  Bell University Laboratories and TEAM
Centre d’appel   fr  $3,615.00  CRSH 
Contagion émotionnelle  fr  $788.50  CRSH 
Corruption  fr  $9,933.71  CRSH and FQRSC 
Endogenous Emergence of 
Voluntary Disclosure 
en  $4,676.25  University of Minnesota 
Gestion de la qualité du service 
par les utilisateurs 
fr  $2,720.00  Bell University Laboratories and 
CRSNG 
Incitation à la protection de terres 
privées 
fr  $6,562.00  Environment Canada in partnership 
with Agriculture Canada 
Satisfaction  fr  $755.50  Bell University Laboratories 
Subject-Based Modelling  en  $1,805.00  FQRSC and SSHRC  
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Measuring Behaviour in a Petri Dish 
 
 
2.1 Uncertainty and Strategy 
 
anks need to know clients’ preferences about risk in order to 
provide investment advice.  Companies need to know their 
employees’ attitudes about consumption over time to provide appropriate 
pension benefits.  Companies need to know the effect of new marketing 
strategies.  Managers need to know how much cooperation or trust exists 
between their employees. 
 
Economics experiments can be used to measure behavioural characteristic 
that occur within two types of situations.  The first type of choice occurs 
under uncertainty.  This is a situation with multiple alternatives for a 
decision maker, where the result of each alternative is uncertain.  An 
example of an individual choice problem is the choice of an investment 
fund. The guiding theory for individual choice is expected utility theory.  
The second type of choice occurs in strategic games, where the results of a 
person’s decision depend on their own decision and the decisions of 
others.  An example of a strategic game is the production choice of firms. 
For strategic choice the guiding theory is game theory. 
 
There are many behaviours that can be measured in each of these two 
categories, and all of these behaviours are important to the functioning of 
businesses, organizations, and institutions.  The following is a summary of 
the most commonly measured behaviours. 
 
2.1 Uncertainty in Life 
Risk Preferences: Risk preferences in part guide a person’s investment 
decisions, migration decisions, and employment decisions.  In a typical 
experiment to measure risk preferences, subjects are given a choice 
B
SECOND PART  
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between several lotteries (Eckel, Montmarquette and Johnson (2006) 
provide an example).  Figure 1 illustrates such a setup.  In the figure, there 
are ten lotteries, each represented by a circle with a vertical line down the 
middle.  Each circle represents a lottery with a 50/50 chance of winning 
either of the amount of money listed on the left of the circle or the 
amount on the right.  For example, the lottery at the very bottom of the 
figure (at the six-o’clock position) represents a 50/50 lottery between the 
outcomes $1.80 and $4.80.  The lottery at the top (at the twelve-o’clock 




Each of these ten circles represents a lottery with two possible prizes.  The lotteries are played by drawing a chip out of a bag.  In the bag, there 
are 10 chips: 5 chips are yellow and 5 chips are blue.  You state which colour, blue or yellow, represents the larger of the two lottery payoffs and 
then draw a chip out of the bag without looking.  If the colour of the chip is the colour you chose, then you earn the larger amount.  If the colour 
of the chip is not the colour you chose, then you earn the lower amount.  Please choose the lottery you most prefer by placing an X over it.  You 
will play the lottery you choose for cash.   
 
The subject’s task is to choose her most preferred gamble, which she will 
then play for cash.  The instrument is designed so that aversion to risk is 
increasing as one moves counter-clockwise around the circle. The way this 
instrument works is that as the expected value decreases, so does the 
2. 80 2. 80
2. 60 3. 20 
2. 40  3. 60
2. 20  4. 00
2. 00 4. 40 
1. 80 4. 80
0.20  7. 00 
1. 20  6. 00 
1. 40  5. 60 
1. 60  5. 20  
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variance, as one moves counter-clockwise among the alternatives.  The 
dollar amount of the prizes can be varied to measure subjects’ 
responsiveness to the size of the stakes. 
 
Ambiguity preferences: Ambiguity preferences guide a person’s choice to try 
new things.  A company full of ambiguity averse employees is unlikely to 
be a source of innovation.  Figure 2 shows an example of an instrument to 
measure subjects’ preferences over ambiguity (Engle-Warnick, Escobal 
and Laszlo (2008) provide an example of the use of this instrument).   
Ambiguity is typically characterized by unknown probabilities over 
outcomes. Thus the difference between this instrument and the previous 
one is that the chances of winning either prize in each lottery are unknown 
to the subject.  As before, the subject chooses the lottery she most prefers 
and then plays it for cash.   
Figure 2 
 
Each of these ten circles represents a lottery with two possible prizes.  The lotteries are played by drawing a chip out of a bag.  In the bag, 
there are 10 chips: each chip is either blue or yellow, and you do not know how many chips are blue nor how many chips are yellow. You 
state which colour, blue or yellow, represents the larger of the two lottery payoffs and then draw a chip out of the bag without looking.  If the 
colour of the chip is the colour you chose, then you earn the larger amount.  If the colour of the chip is not the colour you chose, then you earn 
the lower amount.  Please choose the lottery you most prefer by placing an X over it.  You will play the lottery you choose for cash. 
2. 80 2. 80
2. 60 3. 20
2. 40  3. 60
2. 20  4. 00
2. 00 4. 40 
1. 80 4. 80
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1. 20  6. 00 
1. 40  5. 60 
1. 60  5. 20  
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The formal measure of ambiguity preference involves the difference in 
decisions between the risk instrument (Figure 1) and the ambiguity 
instrument (Figure 2): a subject who is averse to ambiguity will make a 
choice that lies in a more counter-clockwise direction in the ambiguity 
instrument than she does in the risk instrument.  For example, a subject 
who chooses the lottery with the outcomes $1.60 and $5.20 in the risk 
instrument, and then the lottery with the outcomes $2.00 and $4.40 in the 
ambiguity instrument, reveals an aversion to ambiguity.  The larger the 
distance between the two choices, the stronger is the ambiguity preference.   
 
Time preference: Time preferences guide the way a person chooses between 
consuming and saving.  Investments such as schooling and health are two 
examples. The typical style of an instrument to elicit time preferences has 
subjects responding to a question of the type, “How much money would 
you require in ten days to be equivalent to $10 today”.  Both the amounts 
and the time lag are varied to obtain an estimate of the subject’s time 
preferences.  In these experiments, subjects are paid in the future 
according to the time lag specified in the question.  Fredereick, 
Loewenstein, and O’Donohugh (2002) provide a survey of many of the 
elicitation of time preferences.      
 
2.2 Strategy in Life 
Trust:  Trust has been called a lubricant of a social system, and is an 
extremely important behaviour in a world with incomplete contracts.  If 
people or organizations had to enforce more than a fraction of their 
agreements formally, legal costs would increase, costly delays would ensue, 
and opportunities would be missed.  It is a fact that we must trust other 
people, in general, to fulfill their obligations to us. Thus it is often 
important to be able to measure the amount of trust that exists between 
people. 
 
A simple way to do this is with the following game, due to Berg, Dickhaut 
and McCabe (1995).  In this two player game, a Trustor decides whether 
or not to send an amount of money, $0 - $10, to a Trustee.  If she sends 
Trust is essential 
for the economic 
system to work. 
Trust can be 
measured in the 
laboratory.  
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something, it is tripled (as a return on an investment), and then the Trustee 
decides whether or not to return any money to the Trustor.   The measure 
of trust is simply the amount of money that is sent to the Trustee.  The 
measure of reciprocity, trustworthiness, or trust responsiveness, is the 
amount of money returned to the Trustor, conditional on the amount that 
was sent to her.  A bank official might recognize this game as a model of a 
borrower and a lender. 
 
This simple game, which reduces trust and reciprocity to simple actions in 
a way that can only be done in the laboratory, has suggested  that people 
trust others, even when playing the game with strangers, and with no 
chance of building a reputation for trustworthiness.  In repeated games, it 
has been found that subjects learn to trust each other after punishments 
are delivered for untrustworthy behaviour. 
 
Cooperation: Cooperation (or the lack of cooperation, which is called free-
riding) is an issue when a group, not an individual, is responsible for 
providing a good or a service.  Should a manager arrange her workforce 
into teams?  How do we as a society agree to pay for health care? These 
types of issues can be better addressed if we could understand the 
foundations of cooperation. 
 
Cooperation is measured with public goods games.  A public good is 
something that no one can be excluded from using, such as a park, health 
care, or national defense.  The degree to which people willingly contribute 
to a public good is a measure of cooperation.  In a typical laboratory game, 
each member of a group of, say, five subjects begins with an amount of 
money, say, $10.  They then decide simultaneously and anonymously how 
much of their $10 to contribute to the public good.  Each contribution is 
multiplied by two and then distributed evenly amongst all five subjects.   
 
Notice that the maximum amount of total money earned occurs when 
everyone contributes all $10.  Notice also that for every $1 contribution of 
her own, a subject receives back only $0.40.  Despite this fact it is normal 
for many subjects to contribute to the public good, and for these 
How do we as a 
society agree to 
pay for health 
care?  
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contributions to decline if the game is repeated.  If punishment is available 
to direct at a non-contributor, then contributions increase.  Fehr and 
Gaechter (2004) provide a summary of some important findings in this 
area.  Engle-Warnick (2007) provides results about cooperation in several 
different repeated games. 
 
Bargaining: Bargaining is an extremely important mechanism for allocating 
goods in markets, for reaching agreements within and between companies, 
and for taking legislative decisions.  The ultimatum game is used to model 
the last stage of a bargaining process, and can reveal subjects’ preferences 
for fairness in outcomes.  In this game, a proposer proposes a split of an 
amount of money with a responder, and then the responder accepts or 
rejects the split.  Acceptance means the split is implemented, and rejection 
means that both players go home with nothing.  Results from this game 
indicate the modal proposal is a 50/50 split, and that the further away 
from a 50/50 split a proposal is, the higher the chances are that it will be 
rejected.  This was the first game to illuminate the fact that people will 
punish others for unkind behaviour even at a cost to themselves.  This is 
because when a 70/30 split is rejected, for example, the responder is giving 
up 30% of the available pie. 
 
Hundreds of variants of this game have been run to refine knowledge 
regarding what triggers costly punishment.  One such variant is the 
dictator game, in which the proposal is automatically implemented, with 
no chance for the responder to reject. This game was in response to the 
question of whether 50/50 splits were the result of preferences for even 
splits, or fear of a rejected proposal.  Results indicate that the answer is a 
little of both.  This game is an example of the level of control achievable in 
the laboratory: the dictator game is a pure test of revealed preference of 
how to split a pie with another person.  It abstracts away from anything 
else that could influence behaviour or confound inference regarding 
decisions the subjects make.  One can only achieve this level of control in 
a laboratory.  Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin and Sefton (1994) provide a 
classic example of the study of fairness in bargaining. 
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Coordination: Every organization or institution requires coordination among 
people to function. Large companies such as airlines, banks, and transport 
companies obviously require a great deal of coordination between people 
doing very different jobs to function properly.  But coordination is also 
used to explain the existence of social norms, which are things we do to 
escape sanctions from others, such as helping others in distress, driving on 
the right (or left) side of the road, or avoid making noise in our flats late at 
night.  
 
A coordination game is one in which the players, more than anything else, 
wish to match their respective actions.  Coordination games require people 
to answer questions such as, “I accidentally erased a file from my 
computer so I contacted ______”, or “I discovered a violation of a work 
procedure so I spoke with  ______”.  Subjects’ responses are compared 
with each other and if they match, the subjects earn money.  This provides 
the incentive to think about not only how one would respond to the 
question oneself, but also how one expects others to respond.   
 
Coordination thus requires a kind of mind-reading.  It requires the 
formation of common beliefs of the type that “I know that you know that 
I know…to take a particular action”, and “You know that I know that you 
know…to take a particular action”.   One can use such a game to measure 
the ability of employees to coordinate on matters important to a business.  
Mehta, Starmer and Sugden (1992) provide the classic implementation of 
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3.1 The Art of Refinement  
 
ne particular powerful method of inquiry using this 
methodology is the exploration of a phenomenon that is 
suspected in the field.  The problem is that one cannot be sure about it 
because of the confounding multiple explanations that can exist for 
observed behaviour.  In this case one can test such a conjecture using the 
control of the experimental laboratory.   
 
An example of this occurred when Kagel and Roth (2000) studied the 
unraveling of the system for assigning new medical residents to hospitals.  
Upon graduation, students submitted a list of their most preferred 
hospitals in order, and the hospitals ranked the students.  A computer 
program used the lists to generate matches.  Over time, more and more 
hospitals and students began making side agreements on employment 
contracts outside of the matching algorithm, and these agreements were 
being reached earlier and earlier.  The earlier the matches, the less 
education had been completed, and presumably, the less information was 
available upon which to make judgments regarding employment.  Thus a 
question of efficiency resulted from the unraveling of the allocation 
process. 
 
The algorithm was suspected to be the culprit, but in the field, it was 
impossible to isolate it as the cause.  It could simply have been the case 
that local culture would create an unraveling regardless of the algorithm, 
for example. Thus Kagel and Roth (2000) took the matching algorithm 
into the lab, where they observed similar unraveling.  This was a powerful 
result because in the laboratory, the existence of unraveling could only be 




new matching algorithm and observed subjects returning to the central 
matching algorithm.  With this evidence in hand, they recommended 
implementing their algorithm in the field, and this was in fact done. 
 
The following is an example of how we have found that feedback between 
the laboratory and the field can answer questions, and formulate new 
questions that we had not thought of in the first place.  The example is in 
the context of measuring behaviours to explain the persistence of poverty 
in a developing country. 
 
3.1 Too Many Choices in Peru 
In Peru, subsistence farmers are slow to adopt new technologies.  The 
primary technology choice available to these farmers is the choice between 
modern and traditional varieties of seeds to plant.  This is a possible 
contributing factor to generation after generation of families remaining 
poor.  Recently, it has been suggested that having too many alternatives 
can make people worse off (Schwartz, 2003).  In Escobal, Engle-Warnick 
and Laszlo (2008), we asked the question whether the existence of 
additional alternatives affect subsistence farmers’ decision making in Peru.   
 
We designed an experiment, based on the risk preference instrument in 
Figure 1, which allowed us to measure whether risk preferences are 
affected by the addition of an alternative.  We tested this design in our 
laboratory at CIRANO before taking it to the field.  We found that when 
an additional lottery was added to a choice set of two lotteries, farmers in 
Peru appeared to be more risk loving than they were when that additional 
lottery was not present in the choice set.  
 
However, this effect was not seen with student subjects in our laboratory 
at CIRANO.  Our explanation for these results comes from the 
psychological notion of “risk as feelings”.  As we added an alternative to 
the choice set, the Peruvian farmers were more pleased with the choices 
they had, which caused them to behave in a less risk averse manner.  In 
Montreal, the more experienced subjects were not emotionally affected by 
From the 
laboratory to Peru 
helping farmers.   
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the additional alternative, thus they exhibited no change in measured risk 
preferences.    
 
This is an important finding for policy makers.   We normally think of 
adding alternatives as a way of increasing the opportunities for the 
farmers.  But if adding alternative changes the farmers’ attitudes toward 
risk, this should be taken into account when making decisions such as 
subsidizing or providing technical assistance for new technologies. 
 
3.2 Ambiguous Alternatives in Peru 
Escobal, Engle-Warnick and Laszlo (2008) returned to the CIRANO 
laboratory from Peru with a new idea.  Imagine that farmers view 
innovation as an ambiguous, as opposed to a risky, proposition?  If new 
seeds are risky, then presumably both the expected yield and the variance 
of the yield is higher.  If they are ambiguous, then the probability 
distribution of the yield is not known to the farmers.  Could we 
disentangle these two notions, for the first time, with farmers in Peru? 
 
We tested a new experimental design in our CIRANO laboratory, and then 
we returned to Peru with a new instrument, like the one in Figure 2, to 
measure ambiguity preferences.  Our goal was to determine whether the 
measure of risk or ambiguity preferences helped to predict technology 
choices on the farm.  Our method was to combine an experiment with a 
socio-economic survey. 
 
We found that ambiguity aversion did predict some aspects of technology 
adoption.  We also found evidence for learning-by-doing by asking the 
farmers how much experience they had with their technologies.  Learning-
by-doing is the notion that as a farmer uses a technology, she is learning in 
a noisy way about a more productive technology.  At some point in the 
learning curve, she should switch over to the new technology.  With these 
new results in hand, we then designed a more precise test of some aspects 
of our findings back in our laboratory at CIRANO. 
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The findings in Escobal, Engle-Warnick and Laszlo (2007) are exciting 
because until now, it has been assumed that risk preferences affect 
technology choices.  Our finding, that ambiguity aversion is involved, 
suggests a different policy prescription.  If risk preferences matter, then we 
have no evidence against the conjecture that farmers are choosing 
according to their preferences, and we have no policy recommendations to 
make.  If ambiguity preferences matter, then we can suggest that technical 
assistance be designed to reduce the ambiguity to help farmers make more 
informed choices. 
 
3.3 Validating a Finding from Peru at CIRANO 
The findings in Escobal, Engle-Warnick and Laszlo (2007) are important 
to many business and organizational problems, where a question is how 
much job-specific training to provide.  If a manager could identify 
ambiguity averse employees from the beginning, then she could more 
quickly identify the best training methods for the employee.  An owner of 
a company that wishes to be a leader in innovation may want to know 
about a job candidate’s preferences toward ambiguity before making an 
employment decision. 
 
To validate to our findings we repeated the ambiguity and risk preference 
instruments in our CIRANO laboratory, and followed them with a 
learning-by-doing game.  In the game, the subjects’ sole decision was when 
to switch from one technology to the other, as they learned from using the 
current technology.  However, we let subjects pay to practice the game, 
i.e., to explore the results from their decision when to switch, before they 
played the game for pay.  We did this to mimic the real technology choice 
on the farm, using the accepted precise model for doing so. 
 
In Engle-Warnick and Laszlo (2007) we found that ambiguity preferences 
predicted the number of times subjects paid to play the game, i.e., they 
predicted the amount of people were willing to pay to reduce ambiguity.  
But we also found a surprise: overall profit earned in the game was 
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tested in the field.  Thus we validated our ambiguity measure, adding 
strength to our findings in Peru, and we formed a new hypothesis, which 
we plan to go back to the field to test with a new experiment and survey. 
 
3.4 What the Future Holds 
We are conducting several studies in the category of feedback between the 
laboratory and the field, we are currently conducting pay-for-performance 
experiments with businesses in China.  Using the portable capability of our 
CIRANO laboratory, we will shortly conduct experiments in a Quebec 
watershed to test mechanisms for auctioning management practice 
changes on farms to reduce non-point source pollution.  And we will 
shortly conduct experiments with electricity producers to test mechanisms 
for trading carbon permits.  We have recently conducted experiments to 
measure the received tone of media communications by a representative 
sample of voters in Montreal.   
From Montreal 





conomics experiments provide a controlled method for 
understanding and measuring behaviour important to the 
functioning of economic markets, organizations, and institutions.  As we 
have seen, the control that is possible to achieve in the laboratory helps us 
to measure both individual behaviour, and behaviour in strategic 
environments.  Both traditional subject pools at universities and diverse 
subject pools in businesses, schools, and developing countries have refined 
our knowledge of how people behave in important situations. 
 
A particularly compelling line of inquiry available to the experimentalist 
involves refining knowledge regarding a real-life phenomenon in the 
laboratory.  In the end, we obtained more detailed information about 
individual choices by farmers who’s very existence depends on those 
choices than we ever could have without the methodology of economics 
experiments.  Our results inform policy makers who are involved with the 
reduction of poverty. 
 
We showed, using our example of a field experiment in Peru, how the 
laboratory made it possible to design a tool to answer a question in the 
field.  We subsequently showed how additional questions were raised in 
the field, which we attempted to answer with more detailed experimental 
designs, which we first tested in the laboratory.  Finally, a laboratory 
experiment designed to validate our field results gave us a new hypothesis 
to return with to the field.   
 
It is a wonderful time to conduct economics experiments.  Although the 
field is still young, experimental economics is now accepted, and our 
laboratory is well-equipped for both traditional and field experimentation.  
The methodology is well-developed.  And those of us who do this work 
E
CONCLUSION 
Our results inform 
policy makers who 
are involved with 
the reduction of 
poverty.  
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stand on the shoulders of researchers from our own and other disciplines: 
a few years ago the Nobel Prize in economics was awarded to an 
economist (Vernon Smith) and a psychologist (Daniel Kahneman) for 
pioneering work in experimental methods.  Thomas Schelling, another 
recent recipient of the prize, is an original contributor to behavioural 
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